The concept of European civilisation in its historical and cultural aspects took many centuries to form. Its geographical expansion involved the institutional acceptance of common values rooted in the Roman antiquity and in the Latin Christianity. Such an aggregate of commonly shared values was instrumental in creating the medieval European unity and, even though a political unification of the continent did not occur at that stage, the term Respublica Christiana was interpreted in the political sense. In the 20th century, the founders of the European Union searching for the traditions of European unity went back to the heritage of Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Empire (revived in 962). However, this vision of European unity is far from complete as it involves only the western and central parts of the continent. What remains largely underestimated is the eastern tradition of European unity which developed for over four centuries (1385-1795). The case in point is the heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów), established in 1569, a permanent and inseparable union of two states that successfully secured a peaceful coexistence of a multi-ethnic and multi-faith mosaic of Central-Eastern European nationalities, occupying an area of almost a million square kilometres. This territory roughly coincides with what is now Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia. The present study aims to reassess the role of the Eastern European contribution to the idea of European unity, suggesting that it should be considered equally important as the Western European tradition.
Although the Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1772-1795) brought an end to the existence of this political union, its heritage was ultimately lost as late as the 20th century, the era of nation states. Two world wars, ethnic cleansing and mass deportations are among the factors determining a new geopolitical situation in the area of the former Commonwealth. In the European Union, the Central-Eastern European member states have a mission to renew the ties which bound them together for centuries. The success of the project of European integration should not be limited only to Western and Central Europe, but should also include the missing Eastern link. The EU programme of the Eastern Partnership is to be instrumental in achieving this aim.
The idea of the Roman Empire was revived by the German kings from the Ottonian dynasty. Having defeated the Hungarian invaders, they established a unified state in the central part of the continent. In 962, Otto I received the title of the Roman Emperor, which meant a symbolic renewal of the Roman Empire, from then on to be tied to the German throne. The term ‘Holy Empire’, first used in German manuscripts in 1157, stressed the essentially Christian character of the universal state revived in the Western world. The ‘Holy Roman Empire’, a name which first appeared in 1254, reflected the aspirations to continue the traditions of the Western Roman Empire. Such continuity was, however, more of an ideological than geographical nature, as it mainly involved the integration of mostly German-dominated territories of Central Europe along a north-south axis. From 1441, this political entity was finally, albeit unofficially, referred to as the ‘Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation’. This peculiar union of Central European regions continued from 962 until 1806, thus spanning eight and a half centuries. The area which came within its influence fluctuated throughout its long existence and gradually became increasingly limited. While its eastern borders, including the one with Poland, remained relatively stable (M. Knoch 2005), in the south and the west the Empire gradually disintegrated under emancipation pressures.
Although Charlemagne’s kingdom was a short-lived one, it provided a source of inspiration for the historical and modern projects of European integration, both peaceful and par force (N. Davies, Europa). The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation contributed a model of integration based on the unity of heterogeneous components, which at some point included about three hundred states of various political status. Their coexistence was not always harmonious as could be exemplified by a rivalry between Hanseatic cities and the Emperor, or more dramatically by the Thirty Years’ War, which was essentially a civil war. In this context, the experience of a union existing in the eastern part of Europe seems to be very significant. The process of integration continued there over a span of four centuries (1385-1795), and although it lasted shorter than the German Empire, the area covered was considerably larger than the state created by Charlemagne.
The process of formal integration of the Eastern European territories began with the Union of Krewo (1385). The Union of Lublin (1569) established the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a united federal state, whose existence was brought to an end by the Partitions (1795). This is an outline of a strictly formal and traditional approach, but does it really reflect the process of the formation and the significance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth? In order to answer such a question it is essential to avoid the ethnocentric bias which is still widespread in making historical assessments.
Polish historiography still cannot free itself from treating the term Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) as a synonym for Rzeczpospolita Polska (Polish Republic) [the Polish term Rzeczpospolita, a direct translation of Latin res publica, is customarily translated as ‘Commonwealth’ when referring to the pre-Partition Polish-Lithuanian state and as ‘Republic’ to indicate modern Poland]. In addition, Polish historians often mistakenly refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the ‘First Republic’. Consequently, Polish historical atlases usually present the three Partitions of the Commonwealth as the Partitions of Poland. It should be noticed that the name ‘Poland’ was replaced by ‘Commonwealth’ in 1569 and Poles did not enjoy a superior position over other nationalities within the state. Hence the usage of the term ‘Polish Republic/Commonwealth’ to indicate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth reveals an emotional, Polish-centred historical approach formed in an era of nation states. Actually, Polish culture was an important, but not an exclusive component of the federal state. Another terminological misconception is that the Polish Republic created after the First World War, also called the Second Republic, was a direct continuation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In fact, the Second Republic continued the traditions of its predecessor only in geographical terms and even in this respect the continuity was not entirely maintained. Owing to a nationalist attitude prevalent in the new state in that period, the Second Republic let Soviet Russia take over control of these eastern regions of the historical Commonwealth which were considered by the National Democratic Party as too difficult to Polonise. The adopted model of a nation state where one, in this case Polish, ethnic component was to play a dominant socio-cultural role was at odds with the very idea of the old Commonwealth. Consequently, the principle of ‘freemen with free, equals with equal’ could not be continued. As Andrzej Piskozub suggests: „What was created in place of the historical Rzeczpospolita [Commonwealth] was Rzeczpospolita Polska [Polish Republic] [emphasis A. R. Kozłowski]: a state of modern Poles who had been brought up on nationalist ideology, a state where one nation dominated the other ones living within its borders, and where former partners in the union became merely national minorities.” (Piskozub 1995: 134) Stanisław Cat-Mackiewicz referred to the issue as follows: „Poland got as many Ukrainians and Belarusians as it could digest — such was the victory of Dmowski and Grabski’s political programme.” (Mackiewicz-Cat 1990: 208) This is how the heritage of the former Commonwealth was lost. However, it would be unfair to overlook the fact that such policies were not uncommon in contemporary Europe. The central premise of a nation state was that a country should be integrated on the basis of a dominant ethnic component. Distortions of this concept had a tragic impact on the European history of the 20th century. Summing up, the Second Republic was not the sole heir, but rather just one of many heirs of the Commonwealth. Thus grows nationalism.
The pre-Partition history of Poland could be divided into the following stages:
— Polish Principality: 11th-13th c. (territory ruled by the Piast dynasty; a uniform realm until 1138, from then a fragmented conglomerate of feudal duchies);
— Polish Kingdom: 26 June 1295 (coronation of Przemysł II) — 1385;
— Polish Kingdom in a personal union with Lithuania: 1385 (Union of Krewo) -1569;
— The Crown (Korona) as a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: 1 July 1569 (Union of Lublin) -1795.
The integration of the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania began with the act of Union of Krewo (1385) which, through the ensuing marriage between the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiełło and the Polish Queen Jadwiga, established a personal union of the two monarchies. Although it was not the first union of this kind in Polish history, it was the most important so far. The earlier personal unions in Polish history had been those with Bohemia (1300-1306) and Hungary (1370-1384). Jadwiga was a daughter of Louis of Anjou, King of Hungary and Poland (Ludwik Węgierski), a nephew of Casimir the Great (Kazimierz Wielki) who had not left an heir to the Polish throne. When Louis died, Hungarian and Polish thrones were divided between his unmarried daughters Mary and Jadwiga, respectively. This marriage of convenience was to join Poland (208,000 sq km under Casimir) with Lithuania, a country three times this size, which had been dynamically expanding its territory and sphere of influence under the reign of Gedymin (1315-1341) and, even more so, his son Olgierd (1345-1377). Thus Jagiełło inherited from his father what was by far the largest European state at the time. Although most of its population was Orthodox by religion, Lithuania was not recognised as Christian by the Western world and therefore was constantly subject to hostility and military campaigns of the State of the Teutonic Order. In these circumstances, like Mieszko, who in 966 accepted Christianity from Bohemia through his marriage to Dobrava, a Bohemian princess, Jagiełło made a similar move and became Christian under Polish auspices through his marriage to Jadwiga, still under age at the time. What made this union a lasting one was „...the fact that it brought considerable benefits to both countries involved: Poland became a power greater than any of its neighbours and Lithuania joined Europe and accepted its civilisation.” (Piskozub 2008)
The process of integration was, however, gradual and it developed depending on the actual need to provide security against the State of the Teutonic Order and, especially later on, Muscovy. The personal union on the one hand, and pragmatic considerations on the other, were the two factors shaping the awareness of emerging unity, which was later to become an actual political entity. The Union of Mielnik (23 October 1501) laid the foundations for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Grand Duke Alexander and the lords of the Lithuanian Council agreed to unite the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to form one state and to hold common elections of its rulers. This decision indicated that the countries were ready to form the third great union in European history. Although the provisions of the Union of Mielnik were not fully implemented (a common parliament was not established, common currency was not introduced and the idea of elections of the Polish-Lithuanian monarch was abandoned), the process of actual integration proceeded. It was only when Sigismund Augustus (Zygmunt August) realised he was not going to leave an heir to the throne that he decided to establish a lasting constitutional settlement for the future of the state through the act of the Union of Lublin (1569). Royal elections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were held in Warsaw, a convenient meeting point between Cracow and Vilnius.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth formed in this way was a homeland of ‘the nation of nobles’ (naród szlachecki) who shared a common culture. Until the late 18th century, the European social landscape included only very few groups, or estates (the gentry, clergy and burghers), that enjoyed civic liberties. P. Rietbergen outlines the underlying social pattern as follows: „...up till c.1800, Europe actually consisted of ‘two nations’: on the one hand, the agricultural population who lived their lives according to a rhythm fixed largely by nature and which remained fairly constant until the end of the eighteenth century; on the other hand, since the eleventh and twelfth centuries, were the people of the cities, which in many respects remained distinct from their rural hinterlands; there, trade, banking and incipient industry flourished; there, political life had its centre; there, new ideas were formulated and discussed in schools and universities.” (Rietbergen, 1998, 2005: 151) The proportion of the gentry in western Europe amounted to about 1-2% of the population, whereas in the Commonwealth it was as high as 10%. The entire social estate shared the same equal rights and consequently there was no ethnic discrimination. Likewise, there was no ethnic discrimination in the treatment of non-priviledged social groups and Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian peasantry were subject to the same ruthless exploitation regardless of their ethnic background. This balance of (in)equality made it impossible for any nationality to assume the role of a leading power within the Commonwealth.
Lithuanian and Ruthenian boyars (nobility) just like their Polish counterparts made up an intertwined network of Commonwealth extended aristocratic families. Among the leading ones that originated from the Grand Duchy but became inseparably connected with the heritage of the Commonwealth are: the Czartoryski, Giedroyć, Radziwiłł families (Lithuanian), the Sapiehas (Belarusian) or the Wiśniowieckis (Ukrainian). Members of the gentry and noble families did not confine themselves to their original localities but moved to other areas of the federal state. In addition, marriages across ethnic boundaries were common. Consequently, they „...integrated to form one cultural community of the Commonwealth which did not distinguish between ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ and did not have a dominant nation or national minorities” (Piskozub 2008).
The cultural heritage of the Commonwealth includes three crucial factors that contributed to the development of European civilisation: local government, individual liberty and a strategy of unification (Kozłowski 2010). Local government formed in the period of feudal fragmentation of Poland (1138-1295). Lithuania moved from autocracy, which had been its political system prior to the union, to embrace a system of local government and civic rights. The idea of individual liberty that had developed in the Polish Kingdom became a stable part of the political system under Jagiełło. This involved granting individual liberty to the entire ‘nation of nobles’ regardless of the ethnic background of its members. The strategy of integration went through a number of stages (marked by the Union of Krewo and all subsequent acts of union) to result in a united political entity covering a large area of Europe between the Baltic and the Black Sea.
Integration involved a transformation of the model of state so it was only natural that conservative forces would aim to reverse the process. A nationalist approach to Khmelnitski’s Rising (1648-1655) treats it, arguably, as a manifestation of separatist forces posing a threat to the Commonwealth stability. Nevertheless, interpreting it in terms of a national liberation movement seems to be mistaken since it would be more accurate to see it as a religious conflict. Initially, it was his own personal grievances that drove Khmelnitski to take military action against the King’s army. He showed a talent for bringing together his fellow Cossacks and, thanks to his diplomacy, secured the Tartar support. However, he did not have a clear separatist agenda. This could have evolved as the Rising became more and more successful, but Khmelnitski did not manage to dismantle the Commonwealth and the Pereaslav Agreement with Russia (1654) was in fact detrimental rather than beneficial to the Ukrainian cause. Moscow did not consider it as an alliance with Ukraine, but as an act of submission to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. As rightly observed by Feliks Konieczny: „What Moscow did was lead the Cossack elders to expect the same gentry privileges they had been granted by Poland, no changes to local government in Ukraine, no taxation without their prior consent, no Tsar’s local officials but only their own, autonomous ones, subordinate to the Ukrainian Hetman [Commander], the actual ruler of the country, who they would elect themselves; in short — the same kind of status they had acquired under the Kings with the additional benefit of an increased size of the Cossack Register Army (60,000) and guarantees of security for the Orthodox church and its members.” (Koneczny 1997: 142) Ironically, having signed the Pereaslav agreement, Khmelnitski searched for new allies, this time against Russia, in Berlin and Stockholm.
The Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not put an end to the cultural community that had evolved over the course of time. The heritage and memory of a common state divided between the alien powers was cherished for a long time after the actual dismemberment had taken place. The common pantheon of what once had been the Commonwealth was shared among its ethnic communities and included both men of sword and literary figures. The first one in the long line was Thaddeus Kosciusko, the leader of the 1794 insurrection, recognised as Belarusian, Lithuanian and Polish national hero (and called Tadevush Kasciushka, Tadeusas Kosciuska and Tadeusz Kościuszko in the three languages, respectively). Risings against Russia, the largest of the Partitioning Powers, added to the roll imprinted on the common social memory of the former Commonwealth. One of them was Konstanty Kalinowski, the Acting Commissioner of Lithuania during the January Rising (1863-1864), a man who used both his sword and his literary talent to restore the Commonwealth. Among the heirs to the tradition of the Commonwealth were such prominent writers and poets as Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Antoni Baranowski and Czesław Miłosz.
For five generations, the population of the dismembered Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to stand up to the policy of ethnic assimilation. As a result of the three Partitions (1772-1795), Russia seized 63% of the Commonwealth territory, 19.3% was occupied by Prussia and the remaining 17.6% by Austria. This proportion changed after the Congress of Vienna (1815) as the Russian share went up to 81.7%, while the Austrian one was down to 10.7% and Prussians were left with 7.6%. In this part of Europe, the period of a hundred years between 1815 and 1914 was characterised by stability resulting from a status quo maintained by the three Partitioning Powers. Each of them adopted their own strategy of assimilation of the seized territory and its population. Prussia, the smallest one, followed the path of economic integration and Germanisation. Its nationalist policy was pursued within the limits of its legal system, which did not leave much leeway for the national emancipation of the inhabitants of the former Commonwealth. However, the law clearly defined the extent of civil rights. Owing to the relatively higher level of its economic development, the Prussian Partition eventually came to be commonly referred to as ‘Poland A’, the area with the best infrastructure. Austrians allowed more autonomy but economically did not perform as well as Prussians. The multicultural Habsburg Empire was transformed into the Austria-Hungary federation (1867) and there were also some thoughts of pursuing a federal idea to include the Polish component. Analogically to the Prussian Partition above, the Austrian one became known as ‘Poland B’.
Developments in the part of the former Commononwealth occupied by the largest power proved to be crucial for the protection of its heritage. Like in Finland, the initially liberal Russian attitude was gradually replaced by strict Russification (Studnicki 1919). The Russian policy towards Ukrainian historical heritage could be seen as the forerunner of their approach to the eastern parts of the Commonwealth, which were now called the North-Western and South-Western Territories. Having subdued the Cossack state, Russia set out to eradicate all traces of any distinction between Ruthenia and Russia. It went so far as to give official orders to call Ukraine ‘Little Russia’ and the historical Duchy of Kiev was considered the cradle of Russian statehood, which concept became gradually accepted even by bewildered historians from Western Europe. As regards the remaining Russian-occupied part of the former Commonwealth, Tsar Alexander I adopted a twofold approach. The five provinces which he planned to incorporate into his puppet Kingdom of Poland, commonly known as the Congress Kingdom, initially went through a period of what could even be seen as a pro-Polish policy. On the other hand, the Vitebsk, Mohylev and Kiev provinces were intended to be fully Russified, so all administrative posts were allocated almost exclusively to Russians. Tsar Nicholas I extended this policy of unification to include all the provinces. Consequently, Russian Governors were appointed in Grodno and Vilnius in 1828, and the local administration saw an influx of Russian civil servants.
Russification affected also the spiritual life in Lithuania and Ruthenia. Catherine II initiated a policy of forced conversion of the Uniate Church members to the Orthdox faith. This line was continued by Nicholas I who decreed that children from mixed marriages must be brought up as Orthodox (1837). (Studnicki 1919: 51) It was two years later that he ordered compulsory conversion of Uniates. (Kulczycki 1916: 41) S. Koszutski sums up as follows: „The entire reign of Nicholas I was a long stretch of atrocities and acts of violence commited to convert Uniates to the Orthodox faith: punitive expeditions, clubs and whips, torture, mass executions in front of Uniate churches, imprisonment, deportations to Siberia, hard labour colonies, forced enlistment, unspeakable atrocities against Uniate nuns (Basilians). There was deceit and bribery involved as well. Such were the methods which within a matter of a few decades wiped out the Uniate Church in Lithuania and Ruthenia. There were still Uniates in the Kingdom of Poland and they were to be dealt with later, after 1863. The ‘credit’ for this ‘conversion’ goes to the ‘liberal Tsar’ Alexander II.” (Koszutski 1917: 13)
As pointed out by S. Askenazy, the policy of conversion was not limited to Uniates only. Under Nicholas I ‘conversions to Orthodoxy’ included „...Raskolnikovs (255,000), Catholics (64,000), Lutherans (120,000), Jews (22,000), Muslims (21,000), pagans (55,000), Uniates (160,000 plus 1.5 million and 2,000 churches as a result of the dissolution of the Uniate Church in Lithuania and Ruthenia).” (Askenazy 1907: 26)
The three parts of the divided Comonwealth followed diverse paths. The one under Russians was subject to a political system of autocracy, which was detrimental to the spirit of civil liberty and economic initiative. Stagnation in these spheres of social life was a factor behind the emergence of what was to be commonly called ‘Poland C’. However, oriental despotism was met with defiance, as it belonged to an entirely different cultural and political tradition. All the persecutions mentioned above by Koszutski really came down to a peculiar project of ethnic and socio-cultural engineering. In the eastern areas of the former Commonwealth Poles were de-Polonised, and Belarusians and Ukrainians faced coercive Russification. This policy was followed on a great scale, which manifested itself, for example, in a ban on Belarusian and Ukrainian languages. Considering both the time span and the extent of such measures, it has to be noticed that their sense of ethnic identity withstood an extremely hard test. The majority of Poles, Belarusians and Ukrainians, as well as members of the Baltic nations, preserved their identity and did not become Russians.
Towards the end of the partition period, the ethnic composition of the former Commonwealth territory showed a considerably mixed geographical pattern. (Eberhardt 1996: 88-89, Piskozub 2008: 198-199) Statistical data for particular regions indicate that at the turn of the century Poles formed a large majority in western Galicia (79%), the Congress Kingdom (74%) and the Poznan Province (56%). As well as this, they were a large ethnic group in the Vilnius province (42%), West Prussia (34%), the Grodno province (25%) and eastern Galicia (21%). The proportion of Poles in the remaining regions was below 15% of the population. Ukrainians were the largest group in the provinces of Kiev (79%), Podolia (75%), Volhynia (67%), and in eastern Galicia (65%). In the Grodno province the proportion of Ukrainians and Poles was fairly similar (22% and 25%, respectively), but in western Galicia there were only 13% of Ukrainians. They did not exceed 10% of the population in other regions. Belarusians dominated in the provinces of Mohylev (81%) and Minsk (70%), and made up a large proportion of the Vitebsk province (47%). In the province of Grodno, Belarusians were only a narrow majority over Poles and Ukrainians (31%, 25%, 22%, respectively). In addition, they formed a sizeable proportion of the Vilnius province (23%), where Lithuanians made up 18% of the population. It was only the Kovno province which had Lithuanian majority (67%). Latvians dominated in Courland (76%) and were quite a large group in the Vitebsk province (18%).
Other large ethnic communities inhabiting the territory of the former Commonwealth included Germans, Russians and Jews. Germans formed a majority in East Prussia (80%) and West Prussia (64%); in the Poznań province their proportion was as high as 43%. They made up 14.2% of the population in the Cieszyn Silesia and a small proportion of the Congress Kingdom (4.4%). Russians settled only within the Russian Partition. It was only in the Vitebsk province that they were over 10% (12%, to be precise) and the Kiev province had a 5.4% Russian minority. Despite vigorous campaigns of Russification, the remaining Russian provinces rarely had more than 3% of Russians. Jews concentrated mainly in the Russian Partition where their proportion was between 12% (Vitebsk and Mohylev provinces) and 17.9% (the province of Grodno), with the exception of Courland (7.6%). Jewish population amounted also to over 7% in western Galicia and it was 13.7% in the eastern part of the province. There were relatively very few Jews in the Prussian Partition where the figure hardly anywhere exceeded 1%.
The Jewish community constituted an important ethnic group adding to a multicultural character of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was here that Jews found a safe haven, having experienced expulsion from a number of other European countries. This period of tolerance and unconstrained economic activity was brought to an end with the Partitions of the Commonwealth. Russians declared the part they occupied a setlement zone where the Jews were allowed to live. They were taxed at higher rates, forbidden to own land, run public houses and inns, or pursue studies at academic level. The zone was where the Jews from Russia were deported to, which indicates that the seized territories were constantly treated as a colony. The extent of persecution made as many as two million Jews emigrate from there to America, Britain and Palestine.
A new spirit, however, had already appeared in Europe. The French Revolution gave rise to the idea of national emancipation vis-à-vis the royal absolutism of the time, which eventually reshaped France as a nation state. This concept grew stronger and developed with the emergence of Italy and Germany (united in 1871) as nation states as well. In Central-Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the status quo preserved by the Partitioning Powers made it impossible for the inhabitants to follow the path of national emancipation.
In this part of the continent the goal was the liberation from the foreign rule, with the spreading ideology of national self-determination raising hopes for the future. The Balkan Wars and the outbreak of the Great War, a conflict between the Partitioning Powers, were signs of a coming breakthrough. Neither before, nor at the onset of the First Warld War did any prominent politician of the former Commonwealth area aim to create a Polish, Belarusian or Ukrainian nation state. At most, political disputes were concerned with the problem which Partitioning Power should be supported in order to achieve greater autonomy. While Dmowski opted for Russia, Piłsudski and Studnicki were in favour of those who would offer an opportunity to break away from the Russian sphere of influence (over 80% of the historical Commonwealth). The Tsarist regime was unpopular not only among Poles like Piłsudski and Studnicki, but some Russians as well. Prominent among its sworn enemies was Lenin who eventually managed to overthrow the Tsarist autocratic system, only to replace it with his own Soviet version.
In his fight against the declining Tsarist regime Lenin employed various tactics that helped him find allies. One of such moves was to make use of the increasingly popular ideology of national self-determination (Helene Carrere D’Encausse). As confirmed in the course of history, the aim was to defeat the regime and not to liberate the nations. In fact, Lenin created a system which, once in power, became a prison of nations.
As could be expected, the Great War (in which the three Partitioning Powers found themselves on the opposite sides) meant new blueprints for the political settlement for the fomer Commonwealth territory. In 1914, facing an offensive launched by the Central Powers, Russians were prompted to issue a manifesto including important, albeit empty, promises. In fact, the bottom line of the proposed „unification of Polish lands” under the Tsars was that the Russian Empire would expand as far as the western borders of the historical Commonwealth. With the Russian army in retreat at the time, the whole idea was but all talk and no action. German scenarios, including Friedrich Nauman’s Mitteleuropa, sounded more plausible (Goworowska-Puchala 1996). The first real step came with the joint declaration of German and Austrian Emperors known as the Act of 5 November 1916, which proclaimed the restitution of the Polish Kingdom. The document formally declared Partitions of the Commonwealth invalid and promised to create a new state on the map of Europe. While the western borders of the Kingdom were defined, the eastern ones were to be decided after the final victory of the Central Powers on the eastern front.
Although the 5 November Act was important for the Polish cause, it met with considerable opposition from Poles, whose attitudes were mostly anti-German. It is hardly surprising that it was condemned by Russia as well. Prompted by their war calculations in which they needed Russia on their side, the Western Powers expressed their disapproval of such a course of action. The Act certainly kept pace with developments and was to be a step towards a Polish nation state. As seen in the Lausanne protest, Polish opponents of this settlement voiced their concern that it was too generous to Ukrainians and their aspirations for their future independent state. Once achieved, it might take a shape which could be detrimental to Polish national interests. The ideology of national self-determination was slowly taking its own course against the traditions of the former Commonwealth and against the interests of its inhabitants.
German plans were conducive to the emergence of new nation states in the areas of the former Commonwealth which were taken over from Russia. Protected by the military presence of German ocupation forces, the following countries declared their independence in 1918: Ukraine (22 January), Lithuania (16 February), Estonia (24 February), Latvia (23 March), Belarus (25March). Earlier on, when the Russian army had been pushed out, decisions concerning the future independence of Poland and Finland were made (5 November 1916, 5 December 1917, respectively) (Kozłowski 2000: 85). Future historian Paweł Jasienica, a ten-year-old boy at the time, gives an eyewitness account of the escape of his family from Russia to the west, away from the Bolsheviks, across the Brest Treaty border: „We left Maksaticha at the end of the summer or in the early autumn, perhaps. Peace had been in force for a few months, so it was possible to cross the demarcation line, or the border, legally. At the time, it was east of Orsha, not far from the town. ... On our way from Orsha, we went through Homel and Kiev... With our lighter luggage, all our heavy belongings had been left in Vitebsk with my father’s family, we were easily allowed to enter the territory on which a new order was being formed under the German protection. In the east, there was no power that would be able to violate, let alone change the borderline. People like Field Marshal von Hindenburg sometimes spoke of the Eastern nations, especially Poles, not without a certain dose of a moderately friendly attitude. They said they could make a go of it if only they had efficient and sensible German guidance.” (Jasienica 1989: 28-33)
Neumann’s scenario of Mitteleuropa with its principal role of the economic integrating factor stood a strong chance of organising the political shape of this part of the continent. In order to make it happen, Russia had to be pushed back to its ethnic boundaries, which was achieved through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918). (Wheeler-Bennett 1956, Kozłowski 2000) A lasting peace in the east was conditioned by the military situation on the western front. The German army was eventually defeated there and had to withdraw from the east, hence the Brest Treaty settlement was undermined. However, this period of a few months became a symbol of independence as it saw new states being created not only by Poles or the Baltic nations, but also Ukrainians and Belarusians. Until this very day Belarusian opposition cherishes the memory of 25 March 1918 (the declaration of independence) and celebrates it as Belarusian Independence Day. At the time, Belarusian statehood was dependent on the German military presence along the Brest Treaty borderline, which guaranteed protection against the Russian army. Confronted with a defeat in the west, the Central Powers evacuated their troops from the occupied eastern territories, leaving the newly emerged states to face a threat to their very existence as the Bolshevik aggression was soon to follow. The ensuing Polish-Soviet war had its dramatic reversals of fortune and finished with the Treaty of Riga (1921), in which Poland secured its independence. However, adopting Dmowski and Grabski’s nationalist standpoint led to the division of some of the former Commonwealth area between Poland and Soviet Russia, which de facto meant a partition of Belarus and Ukraine. As a result, in its confrontation with Russia, Poland could no longer count on the support of Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalist movements but rather was to treat them as a menace. In this way, having rejected the common tradition of the former Commonwealth, Polish, Belarusian and Ukrainian nations found themselves in a weakened position vis-à-vis the rising power of Soviet Russia.
The Treaty of Riga paved the way for Soviet domination in Central-Eastern Europe. In its first stage (1921-1939) Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia preserved their independence, while Belarusian and Ukrainian populations were divided between the Polish Republic and the Soviet Union. According to the 1931 Polish census there were as many as 1,698,100 Belarusians (5.3% of the population of the country) and 4,441,600 Ukrainians (13.9%) living in the country. (Eberhardt 1996: 103). On the Soviet side of the border, the 1926 census quotes the following figures: The Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic — 4,017,300 Belarusians (80.6% of the Republic’s population) and 34,700 Ukrainians (0.7%) (Eberhardt 1996: 161); The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic — 23,219,000 Ukrainians (80.6%) and 76,000 Belarusians (0.3%) (Eberhardt 1996: 168). The question of Polish and Soviet policy towards Belarusians and Ukrainians became a matter of paramount importance for the future of this geographical area. While the Polish Republic followed the line of Polonisation of its eastern territories, the first half of the 1920s saw a pro-Belarusian and pro-Ukrainian approach adopted across the border. Although in Poland Belarusians and Ukrainians lived under a democratic system and formed their political parties, a great number of mistakes made by the Polish government and administration in their relations with these nationalities made it impossible for a Belarusian or Ukrainian ‘Piedmont’ to emerge. Thus the opportunity to counterbalance the fiction of Soviet Belarus and Ukraine was lost.
The Russians initially followed quite a different line than the Poles. By creating Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics, they granted their peoples surrogate state autonomy. Although the treaties between these Republics and the Russian Federal Socialist Soviet Republic included provisions concerning the right to national self-determination, independence and sovereignity, the act of union turned out to be irrevocable for as long as seventy years. At the beginning, Moscow was eager to gain Belarusian support and did not limit itself to constitutional provisions only, but made real steps as well. The most important one came in 1924 when Belarusian SSR was enlarged from 59,632 sq. km and 1.6 million inhabitants to 110,584 sq. km with a population of 4.2 million ( Głogowska 1996: 76-80). A move like this was conducive to building up trust in the Soviet rule, regardless of the fact that the Republic was already completely controlled from Moscow.
In the USSR, the first decade of the inter-war period was quite promising. In March 1923, Lenin introduced his New Economic Policy (NEP) which diverged from communist ideology and involved liberalising the economy, much to the benefit of the society. Also the political atmosphere made it attractive for Belarusians and Ukrainians living in Poland to move to the Soviet republics, where they could live in their own quasi-states within the USSR. A prosperous ‘nepman’ of the free market economy became a symbol of the new period. Subsequent developments, however, did not fulfil the early promise. As it turned out, the Bolsheviks compromised on their ideals only for a short time and successful individual entrepreneurs were more than they could bear. At the 1929 Agrarniks-Marxists convention, Stalin announced a break with the NEP policy and the beginning of a new revolution. The enforcement of the new socio-economic order brought a widespread famine, a return to serfdom and millions of deaths. The action against kulaks (wealthy farmers) and coercive measures to introduce collective farming, turned into a campaign of terror organised by the regular army and the NKVD security forces, resulting in the death toll of over 10 million across the USSR (Smaga 1992: 93). The famine caused by the Soviet policy (1932-1933) was the most severe in Ukraine, which was surrounded by a cordon of armed forces to cut off food supplies and prevent the starving from leaving the area. As Chojnowski writes: „In most likelihood, as many as three million Ukrainian peasants died as a result of food shortages, a million lost their lives during the campaign against individual land ownership and forced collectivisation, and a further two to three million were deported to Siberia and other parts of the USSR.” (Chojnowski 1997: 99). An earlier outbreak of famine had occured in 1921-1922 and although it was referred to as ‘the famine on the Volga river’, parts of southern Ukraine and the Crimea were also affected. Between a million and a million and a half people died across the USSR during the third famine which was to come after the Second World War (in 1946/47). Even though the authorities tried to explain the tragedy as ‘a consequence of the war’ and ‘a result of a drought’, it undoubtedly was the inadequate policy of the Soviet state administration that was to blame as well.
On balance, as regards the tradition of the Commonwealth, the developments taking place in the area of the former federal state in the inter-war period brought negative results. Recreating a political entity whose borders encompassed a geographical area close to the pre-Partition Jagiellonian community of nations was, as presented above, only a partial success. The nationalist approach that favoured the domination of the Polish majority on the territory of the Polish Republic deprived numerous national minorities living there of their rightful sense of dignity. It was also instrumental in breaking with the old tradition. Consequently, since then, Polish heritage and Polonisation have come to be regarded in the negative light.
However, Soviet Russia pursued a line that brought even more disastrous consequences for its own nation and for the other Soviet republics. Stalin’s aggressive social engineering aimed to create a new Soviet man. He was not only supposed to be completely submissive to the authority but his historical awareness was to be limited only to the remembrance of the dichotomic inequality of social classes which characterised the past. If the national origins of statehood were sought at all, the only acceptable approach was to see the national heritage in terms of the brotherhood of Slavs under the Russian leadership. The trauma of the Soviet terror made the Soviet society realise the necessity to conform to the official ideology, which the bewildered Soviet people eventually came to accept and propagate. This, however, was to be only the first stage of the Soviet domination in the eastern area of the former Commonwealth.
The second stage of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe (1939-1941) involved Nazi-Soviet cooperation, confirmed by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the ensuing partition of the Polish Republic between the two allies. In September 1939, 51.6% of the Polish territory with 37.3% of its population was seized and subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union (Szcześniak 1990: 122). Further annexations of July 1940 made the Soviet sphere of influence extend beyond Belarus and Ukraine and included Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. New territorial acquisitions were subjected to the tried and tested methods. In the annexed territories the Soviets continued their repressions, this time focusing on the Polish population. An ordeal of mass arrests, executions, deportations to Kazakhstan and Siberia, where Poles were decimated by frost and starvation, were a further step in the destruction of the mosaic of ethnic communities on the area of the former Commonwealth. The tragic consequences of the years of Russian and Soviet domination, which left a lasting mark on the lives of millions of people in the region were detailed by Anne Applebaum (Applebaum 2009). Soviet repressions took a much heavier toll on the Polish population than those of the Nazi (Jezierski, Leszczyńska 1992, s. 166). Nazi Germany, on the other hand, turned against the Jews, a long-established ethnic community of the former Commonwealth area.
Although the scale of repression was different, the Nazi extermination of the Jewish population versus ruthless Sovietisation, ethnic cleansing was involved in both cases. In this way, both occupying powers contributed to the process of erasing the Commonwealth heritage.
The consequences of the Second World War completed the course of changes to the ethnic map of Central Eastern Europe. Stalin’s triumph over Nazi Germany coupled with a weak bargaining position of the Western Allies reshaped the geopolitical structure of this part of the continent. Compared to the 1939 annexation, the area taken over by Russia was smaller (180,000 sq. km) and amounted to 46% of the pre-war Polish territory, which was subsequently incorporated into the Soviet republics of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. With the Western Allies approval, Poland, now dependent on the Kremlin and referred to as ‘People’s Poland’, received German territories east of the Oder and Western Neisse rivers (101,000 sq. km) as compensation for its losses. Geopolitically, this meant that the country’s territory was moved westwards and, in accordance with the generally accepted concept of nation state, the entire German population of what now became the western part of Poland had to be transferred. Consequently, the German inhabitants were forced out of the territory where they had been living for centuries, and which now constituted the so-called ‘Recovered Lands’ that belonged to the Polish state. This coercive transfer of population is referred to as the ‘expulsion’ (which it essentially was) by the Germans, a term still much resented by the Poles. Over sixty years after the war this difference of attitude is still in place, as could be exemplified by the activity of the Polish Trust directed against that of the Prussian Trust, an organisation aiming to build a Museum of Expulsion in Berlin to commemorate both this historical event and the heritage of the lands left behind by the Germans.
While the west of Poland was a scene of expulsion of the German population, the Polish inhabitants of the eastern territories that were now across the Russian border went through a process of so-called repatriation. As Piskozub observes: „Stalin...implemented a project that aimed to rid this area of as many Poles living there as possible and that was deviously called ‘repatriation’ (‘a return to homeland’), while its more proper name would rather be ‘depatriation’ (‘depriving of’ or ‘leaving homeland’). People left places where their ancestors had been living for centuries.” (Piskozub 2008: 208) Initially, in western Belarus the public treated the resettlement scheme highly suspiciously. They were afraid of the real intentions of the Soviet authorities and rumours were spreading that it really was to be the next deportation to the East. As well as this, Polish armed resistance movement and Catholic priests discouraged people from leaving their patrimony and interpreted it as treason. „In Grodno, posters announcing the opening of registration procedure were torn off four times, including even those put up in front of the Repatriation Commission building. At night, the first train bound for Białystok was painted with an inscription ‘Traitors to the Fatherland’. On 27 December 1944, a crowd of Poles gathered in the Brest train station to watch which direction the train with the first fourteen resettling families would take. It was only when the train had left for Poland that the Poles started to register for repatriation.” (Szumski 2010: 118) In the course of time, it became unnecessary to encourage people to resettle, as the prospect of leaving the Soviet Union was attractive enough.
Following his Second World War military success, Stalin extended the sphere of Russian influence as far west as the Elbe, which meant that the entire territory of the former Commonwealth was now within the Russian domain. At the same time, he contented himself with political and military control over Central-Eastern Europe and did not fully annex any states except the Baltics. Although the countries of the Soviet Bloc remaining outside the USSR kept their status of independent states, their sovereignity was largely limited and their authorities were controlled by the Kremlin. The Soviet strategy of forging the Eastern Bloc developed gradually. From an open aggression and annexation of territories agreed in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in the first phase of the war, through loosening the grip of terror in the period of a standstill in the Soviet-German cooperation in the autumn of 1940, back to even more violence. Ideas of forming new Soviet republics, including a Polish one, emerged during this renewed campaign of terror. (Bartoszewicz 1999). The outbreak of the Soviet-German war entailed a further evolution of the Soviet policy towards the Central-European nations. The Russians developed training programmes for Communist groups from different countries and put forward a proposal that the Polish Government-in-Exile, as well as Czechoslovakian and Yugoslav authorities, should set up their ‘national committees’ in the USSR to organise their national armies. Although the offer was rejected, Bartoszewicz suggests that it was probably „...then that the Kremlin embarked on the idea of establishing a system of states along its western border. In diplomatic documents and the Soviet propaganda they were referred to as ‘friendly towards the USSR’, while they were really supposed to be dependent on Moscow.” (Bartoszewicz 1999: 16) The idea was further developed and advocated at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences where the Western leaders finally let Stalin take over Central-Eastern Europe as far west as the Elbe, which was to divide the German nation. While using widespread repressions in order to assume control over the countries of the region, the new authorities attempted to preserve the outward appearances of democracy. People were allowed to express their views in referenda and to cast their vote for anti-Soviet parties in elections, but the results of the polls were rigged so that the Kremlin’s protégés could take over.
Although both Belarus and Ukraine had been enlarged at the expense of the Polish pre-war territories, the post-war ethnic composition of these Soviet Republics reveals a similar, relatively homogenous pattern. The figures for Belarusian SSR indicate a gradually declining proportion of Belarusians, from 81.1% in 1959 to 77.8% in 1989, and a rise of the Russian population in the Republic from 8.2% in 1959 to 13.2% in 1989. A similar tendency could be observed in Ukraine, where Ukrainians fell from 76.8% in 1959 to 72.7% in 1989, while the proportion of Russians increased from 16.9% in 1959 to 22.1% in 1989. The size of the Polish population diminished in both Republics: in Belarus from 6.7% to 4.1% and in Ukraine from 0.9% to 0.4% (Eberhardt 1996: 182-194). These figures, however, reflect neither the complex pattern of migrations that entailed changes in the ethnic composition nor the Russification and Sovietisation which accompanied the process.
The People’s Republic of Poland was a country where the idea of nation state was almost fully accomplished. A massive scale of resettlement, especially the expulsion of the Germans from the so-called ‘Recovered Lands’, shaped a state with a 97.6% Polish population, as indicated by the 1954 census (Eberhardt 1996: 127). The picture grew even more one-dimensional as a result of the 1968 anti-Semitic campaign when a considerable number of ‘Jewish Zionists’ (as they were called by the official propaganda) were forced to emigrate. In this way, the system that emerged in the Stalinist period became a prison of nations where each of them was confined to its own cell, which was, in Bierut’s words „national in content and socialist in form”. The whole prison was guarded by numerous uniformed forces that made sure no one left their cells, with the Berlin Wall becoming a symbol of the times.
During the Cold War the entire territory of the former Commonwealth remained under the Soviet domination. The Soviet Republics within the USSR saw an increase of the Russian population and experienced a progress of Sovietisation. However, this process did not remain unchallenged as it was met with both passive and active resistance. Movement against the Soviet power was active in the formally independent states of the Eastern Bloc, as well as in the Soviet Republics. As observed by Szumski, it was relatively weakest in Belarus. Considering the scale of repressions against those who opposed the system, it was a symptom of a lasting resistance against the Soviet domination in this part of Europe. The Soviet Bloc was not a quiet region throughout the entire Cold War. Every few years in one country or another there were protests which formulated economic demands or openly called for political independence. The former included, for example, riots in the Gulag camps after Stalin’s death, protests in Novocherkask (1963), East Germany (1953) and Poland (1956, 1970, 1976). Among the major independence and revisionist protests were the ones in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980). An unprecedented wave of protest that swept right across all the countries of the Bloc completed the fall of the Yalta order in 1989. The USSR itself was not left unaffected (1989-1990), including the events in Vilnius (1991). These dates and locations do not make up a full list of protests against the Big Brother. The strength of resistance to Russian hegemony becomes more evident in a broader perspective. In spite of two hundred years of Russian domination (1795-1991) involving Russification and the rule of terror, it was possible for nation states to emerge in the area of the former Commonwealth after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, they no longer shared a common state and civilisational heritage. In the course of history they had become separate entities shaped and reshaped by the many actions of ethnic cleansing, deportations and Soviet ideological indoctrination they went through. Having emerged from a cultural vacuum created by the two-hundred-year-long Russian domination, they found themselves detached from the Western civilisation they had once been a part of. It was especially the Belarusian and Ukrainian nations that faced a serious challenge of consolidating the right to their own independent states.
Poland and the Baltic States needed a period of over a decade to join the NATO and the European Union and thus make their return to the structures of European civilisation. At the same time, Belarus and Ukraine, although independent, have remained under considerable Russian influence and pressure from Moscow, which refers to them and other former Soviet republics as ‘just-across-the-border’ states. The Kremlin torpedoed all the efforts aimed at bringing these countries closer to the West. As well as this, Moscow actively supported its political allies such as the Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich. Rigged presidential election in Ukraine in 2004 provide a perfect example of such a political line. It was not always the case that the nations found enough strength and energy to challenge Russian interference as successfully as the Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution. Social engineering that had been applied by the Soviets shaped the post-Cold War societies which are often indifferent as to the choice of which civilisational model to follow. Apathy and inertia, even if they do not equally affect all the social groups, are characteristic features of post-Soviet societies in general.
Two decades of Belarusian independence have seen a growing awareness of its own national statehood. At the same time, it has also been a period of mounting tension between Russia and its neighbours, owing to the Russian policy of increasing its political influence over, and the economic exploitation of, ‘just-across-the-border’ states. Consequently, Belarus and Ukraine have had a number of conflicts with Russia over natural gas supply and transit. According to a 2002 Belarusian survey, a hypothetical integration with Russia commanded a 53.8% support and its opponents amounted to 26.3%, while responses to a similar question regarding a hypothetical integration with the European Union indicated that 60.9% were for and 10.9% against such an idea (Manaev 2002). As indicated by the results of a 2009 survey conducted by a Lithuanian-based Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, 38.8% of those questioned supported a hypothetical integration of Belarus with Russia, and 44.3% were against it. With regard to a similar question concerning the hypothetical accession to the European Union, 41.4% supported such an idea and 39.8% opposed it (IISEPS 2009). Only about 15% of respondents were indifferent or opposed to any integration process.
The historical heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as well as a shared dramatic experience of the Soviet occupation, form a basis for the development of a project aiming to reintegrate the entire region with the Western civilisation, which is now represented by the European Union. However, such a project cannot rely exclusively on Polish activity or on cultural Polonisation, as this idea was compromised by the policy of the National Democratic Party in the inter-war period. Instead, reintegration has to be based on the willingness to work together for the mutual benefit, must be free of nationalistic rhethoric, but rather re-embrace a tried and tested principle of ‘freemen with free, equals with equal’. Polish-German cooperation both in the pre-accession period and within the European Union sets a perfect example to follow. The inhabitants of the former Commonwealth area have the advantage of a common historical experience of a union that bound them together for centuries. What works to their disadvantage is Russian and Soviet destruction of this heritage.
Fostering nationalist views in the 21st century Europe must be seen as a regressive activity unsuited to the needs of the contemporary changing civilisation. This, however, does not mean that the growth of Belarusian or Ukrainian national awareness should be left unsupported. Quite on the contrary, in this geographical area due attention given to the development of a nation’s own state strengthens the sense of independence and autonomy in the sphere of international relations. It is important, however, that this process should not involve discrimination against national minorities and that, in turn, national minorities should not turn against state institutions of the country they live in. The Polish Union in Belarus, an organisation which is not recognised by President Lukashenka, could function as an ambassador for European cultural values and play a role similar to that of the British Council or Alliance Française, organisations promoting British and French language and culture. The Polish Union could expand the scope of its activities to include the promotion of the European Union, attractive work placement schemes for teachers of all levels of the educational system and exchange programmes for young people. This would pave the way for a dynamic cultural exchange.
At present, the process of reintegration should not be oriented only towards finding a new formula for the reconstruction of the links binding the countries of the former Commonwealth area itself, but also towards a broader European integration project. A Polish-Swedish initiative to create an EU programme of Eastern Partnership is an institutional formula that sets out to achieve such an aim. In practical terms, it could be developed through intensified economic cooperation and know-how exchange in such areas as education, administration and energy security.
An idea of a Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusian-Lithuanian federation proposed after the First World War by those who cherished the tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was rejected by the nationalists of all the nation states concerned. The coordinating role of Poles in such a federation was unacceptable to Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians. In Poland, the National Democratic Party was also against this idea. In its contemporary dimension, European integration departs from the concept of nation-based territorial organisation. The course of development of the European Union makes it slowly evolve into a federation of European historical regions, such as the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The European Union needs to remember about great suffering that this geographical area went through in the 19th and 20th century. It should also open up a prospect of reintegration of this part of the continent with the European structures. This process requires considerable preparations and will be successful only on a sine qua non condition that Ukrainian and Belarusian nations want it.
Translated from Polish by Piotr Styk
STRESZCZENIE
Autor odnosi się do cywilizacyjnego pojęcia Europy w jej płaszczyźnie historycznej i kulturowej, jakie kształtowało się od wielu wieków i rozprzestrzeniało swój zasięg wraz z instytucjonalnym przyjmowaniem wspólnych wartości, sięgających korzeniami cywilizacji antycznej oraz religii chrześcijańskiej. Zwraca się uwagę na tradycję jedności europejskiej wyrażaną w zachodnim obszarze Starego Kontynentu przez dziedzictwo cesarstwa Karola Wielkiego, odrodzonego w centralnej części kontynentu, a założonym przez Ottonów Świętym Cesarstwie Rzymskim (trwającym blisko dziewięć wieków), oraz co szczególnie istotne dla niniejszego opracowania — trwającą cztery wieki jednością europejską we wschodnim obszarze kontynentu, wyrażoną przez integrowanie się tej części Europy, a zwieńczonej w postaci Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów. Zestawienie efemeryczności realnego bytu państwa Karolingów i ponadczasowego znaczenia jego symboliki w kontekście europejskich idei integracyjnych z czterowiekową tradycją państwową dawnej Rzeczypospolitej służyć ma za asumpt do stosownego wartościowania tak ukształtowanej tradycji.
Autor umieszcza powstałe z unii państwo w powszechny wówczas w Europie trend, w którym Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów, mimo swej nazwy, nie była typowym dla późniejszych czasów państwem narodowym, lecz stanowiła ojczyznę narodu szlacheckiego, z proporcją znacznie korzystniejszą dla mieszkańców RON. Dyskryminacja była wolna od uprzedzeń etnicznych i w równym stopniu dotyczyła chłopa polskiego, ukraińskiego, czy białoruskiego. Równemu, z perspektywy etnicznej, traktowaniu chłopstwa, towarzyszyły równe prawa należne szlachcie. Równość ta wykluczała nadanie jakiemukolwiek narodowi roli władczej.
Siły czy wydarzenia dezintegracyjne ujęte zostały z perspektywy interpretacji procesów cywilizacyjnych. I tak powstanie Chmielnickiego określane jest nie jako zryw narodowowyzwoleńczy, a konflikt wyznaniowy co celniej oddaje ducha epoki. Autor przyznaje jednocześnie, że ugoda perejasławska z Rosją zaszkodziła już konkretnie sprawie ukraińskiej. Sprawę Chmielnickiego w Moskwie traktowano nie jako zawarcie sojuszu, ale jako całkowite poddanie się carowi Aleksemu Michajłowiczowi. Dano Kremlowi tym samym argument na rzecz rusyfikacji nie tylko narodu ukraińskiego, ale i historii Ukrainy.
W odniesieniu do kulturowego dziedzictwa Rzeczypospolitej podnosi się trzy podstawowe wartości — samorząd, wolność osobistą oraz unię — stanowiące o twórczym wkładzie RON w rozwój cywilizacji europejskiej. Rozbicie tak stworzonej Wspólnoty w wyniku rozbiorów Rzeczypospolitej nie oznaczało przekreślenia powstałych więzi kulturowych. Pośród ponadnarodowych bohaterów autor wymienia tak znakomite nazwiska jak Tadeusz Kościuszko, Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Antoni Baranowski czy Czesław Miłosz.
Podkreśla się cywilizacyjną odmienność Rosji, jako największego pośród zaborców, która po 1815 r. panowała nad 81,7% terytorium dawnej Rzeczpospolitej. Jej polityka ewoluująca od liberalizmu w kierunku całkowitej rusyfikacji, a następnie sowietyzacji i unifikacji z Rosją, w tym polityka samodzierżawia zabijająca ducha obywatelskiego i zniechęcająca do inicjatywy gospodarczej, stanowiła poważne wyzwanie dla zachowania cywilizacyjnego dziedzictwa RON. Oddziaływanie orientalnego despotyzmu napotykało jednak na wyraźny opór cywilizacyjnie odmiennie ukształtowanej społeczności dawnej Rzeczpospolitej. W swej masie zarówno Polacy, jak Białorusini i Ukraińcy, a także Bałtowie zachowali swą tożsamość i nie stali się Rosjanami.
I wojna światowa, a zwłaszcza Akt 5 listopada 1916 r., przekreślający zabory i zapowiadający powstanie nowego podmiotu politycznego na mapie Europy, zwiastował zmianę porządku politycznego na obszarze dawnej Rzeczpospolitej. Tym razem dominującym stawał się duch nacjonalizmu oraz upowszechnianie się idei prawa narodów do samostanowienia. Pod ochroną okupacji niemieckiej i w tle pertraktacji Pokoju Brzeskiego w 1918 r. ogłaszały niepodległość: Ukraina — 22 stycznia, Litwa — 16 lutego, Estonia — 24 lutego, Łotwa — 23 marca, Białoruś — 25 marca. Wcześniej po wyparciu wojsk rosyjskich postanowiono poza niepodległością Polski — 5 listopada 1916 r., także o Finlandii — 5 grudnia 1917 r. Pokonane ostatecznie na Zachodzie wojska niemieckie, musiały się wycofać ze Wschodu, a tym samym zagrożona stawała się trwałość zdobyczy Pokoju Brzeskiego. O kształcie międzywojennej przestrzeni w tej części Europy zadecydowała wojna polsko-sowiecka, zakończona Pokojem Ryskim, w którym strona polska zatroszczyła się już wyłącznie o swój wąsko rozumiany interes narodowy, oddając sporą część dawnej Rzeczpospolitej wraz z zamieszkującymi te tereny ludnością białoruską i ukraińską pod sowieckie panowanie. Rzeczpospolita Polska postawiła na polonizację kresów, gdy tymczasem po drugiej stronie granicy w pierwszej dekadzie dwudziestolecia międzywojennego postawiono na białorutenizację i ukrainizację. Białorusini i Ukraińcy w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej korzystali z praw, jakie dawała im demokracja, organizując się w partie polityczne, ale wobec licznych błędów popełnianych przez polski rząd i administrację w odniesieniu do tych grup, przekreślono szansę powstania białoruskiego czy ukraińskiego Piemontu. Zmarnowano tym samym szansę przeciwwagi wobec fikcji sowieckiej Białorusi i Ukrainy.
Autor zwraca przy tym uwagę na pokutujący w historiografii polskiej pogląd o utożsamianiu na zasadzie synonimu określenia Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów z Rzeczpospolitą Polską, wskazując na kulturowe i ideowe różnice pomiędzy państwem przed- jak i porozbiorowym.
Bilans dwudziestolecia międzywojennego w obszarze dawnej Rzeczpospolitej i w odniesieniu do tradycji Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów autor ocenia negatywnie. Odtworzenie podmiotowości politycznej w obszarze geograficznym zbliżonym do jagiellońskiego obrysu przedrozbiorowej wspólnoty narodów stanowiło korzyść połowiczną. Nacjonalistyczna orientacja na dominację etnosu polskiego w obszarze Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej odbierała stosowną godność licznym mniejszościom narodowym i stanowiła asumpt do przekreślenia dawnej tradycji. Polskość i polonizację postrzegano odtąd negatywnie.
Ostateczne zerwanie z dziedzictwem nastąpiło w nacjonalistycznej epoce państw narodowych pierwszej połowy XX wieku naznaczonej przez dwie wojny światowe, czystki etniczne, masowe przesiedlenia ludności, sowietyzację. Konsekwencją dwudziestowiecznej traumy jest kryzys tożsamości europejskiej w odniesieniu do obszarów dawnej Rzeczpospolitej ugruntowany przez nacjonalistyczne rządy państw spadkobierców Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów powstałe po pierwszej wojnie światowej, Aliantów oddających gładko tę część Europy we władanie Stalina w wyniku drugiej wojny światowej, a także reprezentowany przez tę część samych mieszkańców Białorusi i Ukrainy, którzy do dnia dzisiejszego nie mogą wyzwolić się z brutalnie ukształtowanej mentalności homo sovieticus.
W czasie Zimnej Wojny całe terytorium dawnej Rzeczpospolitej znalazło się w strefie sowieckiej dominacji. W republikach związkowych ZSRR przybywało ludności rosyjskiej, postępowała sowietyzacja. Ta jednak napotykała zarówno bierny jak i aktywny sprzeciw. Ruch oporu wobec władzy sowieckiej funkcjonował zarówno na terenie republik sowieckich, jak i w państwach formalnie od ZSRR niezależnych. O sile oporu przeciw hegemonii Rosji w tej części Europy świadczy fakt, że mimo naznaczonej terrorem i rusyfikacją, dwustuletniej (1795-1991) dominacji Rosji nad większą częścią dawnej Rzeczpospolitej Obojga Narodów, po rozpadzie ZSRR w 1991 r., mogły w tym miejscu powstać państwa narodowe. Nie tworzyły już one cywilizacyjnej wspólnoty państwowej, ale stanowiły odrębne byty silnie zmienione na skutek licznych czystek, wywózek w głąb Rosji, ideologicznej indoktrynacji sowieckiej. Wydobyte z tych kulturowych gruzów, by nie powiedzieć cywilizacyjnej pustki, jaką stanowiła ta dwustuletnia wyrwa oderwania od wcześniej zakorzenionej tu cywilizacji zachodniej, szczególnie narody białoruski i ukraiński poddane zostały niezwykle trudnej próbie, utrwalenia prawa do samodzielnego bytu. Polska oraz państwa bałtyckie potrzebowały nieco ponad dekady, by poprzez takie instytucje jak NATO i Unia Europejska powrócić do struktur cywilizacji europejskiej. Białoruś i Ukraina pozostały zaś pod silnym wpływem i naciskiem Rosji, określającej te i pozostałe byłe już republiki sowieckie, jako państwa „bliskiej zagranicy”. Kreml torpedował wszystkie te działania tych państw, które zbliżałyby je do Zachodu. Zdaniem autora dziedzictwo historyczne Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, ale też tragiczne doświadczenia okupacji rosyjskiej, stanowią podstawy do kształtowania projektu reintegracji całego obszaru dawnej Rzeczypospolitej z cywilizacją europejską reprezentowaną dzisiaj przez Unię Europejską. Nie może być to jednak projekt oparty na wyłącznych działaniach Polski i kulturowej polonizacji, bo ta zdążyła się skompromitować endecką polityką w okresie dwudziestolecia międzywojennego. Rehabilitacja opierać musi się na rzeczywistej woli wypracowania obustronnych korzyści, wolnych od narodowej retoryki na sprawdzonej zasadzie „wolnych z wolnymi, równych z równymi”. Misyjne działanie reintegracyjne rozumiane jest jako zadanie na rzecz odtwarzania pamięci kilkusetletniego dziedzictwa europejskiej jedności Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Tym samym przywrócenie warunków do reintegracji tej części Starego Kontynentu z jednoczącą się Europą w ramach struktur Unii Europejskiej.
Artur Roland Kozłowski — 1972, PhD in political sciences, Master of Business Administration, Academy of Economics in Poznan, Poland — Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA. Dean of Economic and Management Faculty at Gdansk School of Banking. Author of a book entitled Rosja wyparta z Europy. Geopolityka granicy pokoju brzeskiego 1918 r. (Russia Driven out of Europe. Geopolitics on the Border of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918). Author of a number of publications on geopolitics, political science, civilization and economics.
References
1. Applebaum A., Between East and West. Cross the Borderlands of Europe, Pantheon: 1994.
2. Askenazy Sz., Rosya-Polska 1815-1830, Lwów: 1907.
3. Chojnowski A., Ukraina, TRIO, Warszawa: 1997.
4. Eberhardt P., Między Rosją a Niemcami. Przemiany narodowościowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w XX w., PWN, Warszawa: 1996.
5. Głogowska H., Białoruś 1914-1929. Kultura pod presją polityki, Białystok: 1996.
6. Goworowska-Puchala I., Mitteleuropa. Rdzeń Starego Kontynentu, ADAM MARSZAŁEK, Toruń: 1996.
7. Jasienica P. (Beynar L.), Pamiętnik, Kraków: 1989.
8. Jezierski A., Leszczyńska C., Dzieje społeczno-gospodarcze Polski do roku 1950. Próba syntezy, UW, Warszawa: 1992.
9. Kersten K., Narodziny systemu władzy. Polska 1943-1948, Poznań: 1990.
10. Knoch M., Święte rzymskie Cesarstwo (962-1806) i dawna Polska (966-1795). Osiem wieków dobrego sąsiedztwa, GRADO, Toruń: 2005.
11. Koszutski S., Co nam Rosja dała i co nam wzięła?, Warszawa: 1917.
12. Koneczny F., Dzieje Rosji, Kraków: 1997.
13. Kozłowski A.R., Partnerstwo wschodnie a dziedzictwo tożsamości obywatelskiej mieszkańców dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, [w:] Annus Albaruthenicus 2010. God Bełaruski 2010, red. Sokrat Janowicz, Villa Sokrates, Krynki: 2010.
14. Kulczycki L., Królestwo Polskie 1815-1914, Kraków: 1916.
15. Mackiewicz-cat S., Historia Polski od 11 listopada 1918 r. do 17 września 1939 r., Warszawa: 1990.
16. Manaev O., Belarus’ national and geo-political self-identity, 2002
17. Piskozub A., Polska w cywilizacji zachodniej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk:1995.
18. Piskozub A., Wspólnota cywilizacyjna mieszkańców Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, [w:] Problematyka geopolityczna ziem polskich, Prace geograficzne nr 218, red. P. Eberhardt, Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN, Warszawa: 2008.
19. Rietbergen P., Europe. A Cultural History, Routledge, London: 1998, Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005; Polish edition: Rietbergen P., Europa Dzieje kultury, KSIĄŻKA I WIEDZA, Warszawa: 2001.
20. Smaga, Narodziny i upadek imperium ZSRR 1917-1991, Kraków 1992.
21. Studnicki W., Finlandia i sprawa finlandzka, Kraków 1912.
22. Studnicki W., Północno-Wschodnie ziemie dawnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa: 1919.
23. Szcześniak A.L., Zmowa. IV Rozbiór Polski, Warszawa: 1990.
24. Szumski J., Sowietyzacja zachodniej Białorusi 1944-953. Propaganda i edukacja w służbie ideologii, ARCANA, Kraków: 2010.
25. Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) http://www.iiseps.org/eopros55.html